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Abstract
The research describes and explains the wave of protest movement in the
Kingdom of Morocco, one of the Muslim countries in the Western Arab, in
the post-2011 constitutional referendum. The constitutional reform was car-
ried out as a response to the large and massive people protest. Unlike the cases
in other neighboring states where “Arab Spring” took place, the Moroccan
movement receded without neither the fall of the regime nor massive casual-
ties. However, intense protest kept taking place, especially in Muhammad V
Street leading to the Parliament Building. Some interesting questions arise,
including what the nature of the current protest is and why people still pro-
test after the vast popular agreement toward the constitutional referendum.
Based on library research and intense observation for forty days, and inter-
views, this study found that, to some extent, the Morocco protest has the
same nature as that of the Arab Spring. The protest has “hidden agendas”
although there are evidences that they dissembled in “smaller and partial is-
sues because of some reasons”. The author holds that Morocco is an impor-
tant lesson for political reform in the current turbulent Arab world and, to a
broader context, in the Muslim world.
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Penelitian ini mendeskripsikan dan menjelaskan gerakan protest di Kerajaan
Maroko, salah satu negara Muslim di Arab Barat, paska  referendum konstitusi
tahun 2011. Reformasi konstitusional di Maroko telah dilaksanakan sebagai
respon terhadap protes rakyat dalam skala luas dan massif. Berbeda dengan yang
terjadi di negara-negara “Musim Semi Arab” yang lain, gerakan protes itu surut
tanpa disertai jatuhnya rezim dan jatuhnya korban dalam jumlah yang besar.
Namun, Maroko masih diwarnai gerakan protes yang cukup intensif hampir
setiap hari (kendati skalanya lebih kecil)  khususnya di Jalan Muhammad V
sampai depan gedung parlemen. Pertanyaannya adalah apa sesungguhnya karakter
dari protes-protes yang masih berlangsung bahkan hingga saat ini? Mengapa mereka
masih melakukan protes pasca persetujuan secara luas rakyat Maroko terhadap
reformasi konstitusi? Penelitian yang dilakukan dengan cara studi kepustakaan
yang didukung oleh observasi di lapangan sekitar 40 hari, berkesimpulan bahwa
karakter protes itu adalah “Arab Springs” (mengarah pada penjatuhan rezim)
kendati itu tak dinyatakan secara terbuka. Mereka memiliki agenda terselubung
itu dan tidak mengemukakannya dengan berbagai alasan. Penulis berpendapat,
Maroko adalah pelajaran penting bagi reformasi politik di dunia Arab yang sedang
bergolak saat ini, bahkan mungkin pula untuk dunia Islam.
Keywords: Protest movement; Constitutional reform; King’s popularity; Arab Springs
Introduction
The Morocco protest is unique in the context of the vast and massive pro-
test movements in the Arab world known as the Arab Spring. In Moroc-
can case, the protest had begun much earlier than the first Arab spring
movement in Tunis did. The protests that called for the various demands
especially political and economic reformations had run since the 1990s.
The “usual” protest, then, escalated rapidly before the resign of Zein el-
Abidin ben Ali from Tunisian presidency due to the massive people pro-
testing against his regime. The “usual” Morocco protest movement was
influenced and strengthened by the Tunisian revolt and the spread of popu-
lar movements against their regimes throughout the Arab world. The
movement became more complex, as it did not only demand the reforma-
tion on special issues, but also demanded the fall of royal regime just as in
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the other Arab states. The movement, according to some media reports
confirmed by some key informants,1 involved more than a million people
approximately. Of course, it was the biggest popular protest movement in
Moroccan history. Many analysts claimed that the fate of the Morocco
regime will be similar to that of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes.
The other uniqueness of the Morocco protest is the fact that the mas-
sive and large protests “found” its peaceful solution. The protest resulted in
neither massive casualties nor massive destructions of infrastructures and
social relations as in four “Arab Spring countries” (Syria, Libya, Egypt and
Yemen).2 The peaceful solution was achieved in the 2011 constitutional
reform and the referendum on the new constitution. The new constitu-
tion (2011) includes a partial curbing of the King’s power while strengthen-
ing the parliament, and supports “democratic governments” and other
democratic institutions.3 However, the King still has the full authority in
defense, religious and foreign affairs.4 In fact, the massive and large dem-
1 The author interviewed some Morocco figures  like ASB one of prominent thinkers,
BHS a political analyst,   LEM a reseacher, and many other figures. They generally described
the Morocco situasion at the timewas very dangerous, but in the end the Moroccon people
found the peacefull solution through constitution’s referendum July 1, 2011.Of course,
Maroccon newspapers like Ahdats June 27, 2011 and other newspapers placed  this crucial
Morocco events as headline.
2 The terminology of Arab spring countries refers to Arab countries in which authori-
tarian rulers or regimeswere overthrown by people protest movement, known popularly as
Arab spring in the West and Arab people revolt (al-Tsaurat al-Arabiyyah al-Sya’biyyah) in
the Arab world.  See Ibnu Burdah, Islam Kontemporer: Revolusi dan Demokratisasi, Malang:
Intrans, 2014.
3 In addition, the new constitution recognizes Tamazight language and cultures as offi-
cial languages other than Arabic.It also stipulates the state to protect the heritage of Hassaniya
language and culture. Until recently, both languages and cultures were marginalized so that
causes to rise of various protests. Edisoft, Dustur al-Mamlakah al-Maghribiyyah ma’amulhaq
binataijistiftayuliyu 2011, Rabat: Edisoft, 2012, 29-56.
4 Edisoft, Dustur al-Mamlakah..., 29-36. The Current Moroccan King, Muhammad VI,
is well  known more liberal and “democratic” comparing to the Hasan II or Muhammad V.
Annemarie Iddins, “Debating Darija: Telgual and Language Politics in Modern Morocco”,
Media, Culture, and Society Journal, Vol. 37, No.2 (2015), 289.
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onstrations in various cities in the Kingdom stopped and almost 100% of
the people agreed with the new constitution in the relatively free referen-
dum despite the strong campaigns of pro-government media.
However, another new wave of protests began. In this protest move-
ment, the author witnessed, observed, and was inside the  protest move-
ment concentrated in King Muhammad V Street, especially in front of
the Morocco Parliament Building from 10 November to 20 December
2012. Unlike the “massive protest”, the new protest likely has a “usual”
nature.5 The protesters did not explicitly demand for a regime change,
but merely demanded some “small issues”, such as job and direct integra-
tion of graduate students”.
The research questions on the “new demonstration waves” that guide
this study include what the nature of the protest movement is, whether the
protest has Arab spring in nature or a “partial movement with specific
demand such protest movement long before the explosions of Arab spring,
whether it is similar in nature to the massive protest in the pre-constitu-
tional referendum era, why they still make protest movements even after
the “significant reduction in King’s authority” and the strengthening of
the various democratic institutions and the vast agreement of the people.6
The nature of the protest movement
The phenomenon of popular protest in Morocco after the constitutional
referendum is similar to that before Arab springs broke out. It means the
5 By “usual protests”, I mean the long and continuing series of people protest done
several years before the spread of Arab spring. The Author saw the demonstrations almost
every day and they call for al-indima >j al-muba >shir (job) , and I didn’t listen from them the
calling for fall of the regime publicly. The slogan that they call is more al-sha’b yuri>d isqa >t} al-
h }ukumah (people want the fall of  goverment). They avoid the old slogan al-sha’b yuri>d isqa >t}
al-niz}a >m “people want the fall of regime”
6 The constitutional committee states that the number of people agreeing with the 2011
constitutional reform (vote for Yes/na’am) is 9,909,352, and that rejecting (vote for No/
La >) is 154,067, Edisoft, Dustur al-Mamlakah..., 95.
205
Morocco protest movements in the post-constitutional reform (Ibnu Burdah)
protests are continuation of the “old” protests in Morocco long before the
massive Arab people movements demanding the fall of the authoritarian
regimes. The old protests did not call for a resignation of the regime openly
because such demand used to lead to the severe responses by the security
forces, and finally to the insignificant results in political negotiations.7
What the author witnessed in the protests in November-December 2012
in front of the Parliament Building and along the Muhammad V Street in
general confirmed that.The protests never voiced any demand to the re-
gime (the royal family, especially the King). There were no such slogan,
banner, or pamphlet as “al-Sha’b yuri>d isqa>t} al-niz}a>m” (People want the fall of
regime), or irhal, irhal (leave, leave the country) but “al-Sha’b yuri>d isqa>t} al-
h}ukumah” (People want the resign of Government), La> li al-zabuniyyah wa
al-mahsubiyyah wa al-rishwah (No for clientelism, nepotism, and bribery),
and idma>j muba>shir (direct integration of Master and Doctoral degrees).8
The protesters were also less limited, most of whom were undergradu-
ate students and master and doctoral graduates in various fields such as
medicine, engineering, pharmacy, natural sciences, as well as social and
Islamic studies. “Natural sciences” students were the majority, while those
from political or social sciences were the minority. The protesters, many
of them were women,9-as the author asked some of them-came from
various cities in the Kingdom of Morocco especially the neighboring ci-
ties of Dar al-baydha (Casablanca), Marakesh, Tangier, and Fes. The
7 Abdurrahim al-Athari, Dafa >tir Wijhat al-Naz}ar, al-H }arakat al-Ihtija >jiyyah bi al-Maghrib,
Rabat: n.p., 1997, 90-93.
8 The author conclude this  from brochures and also slogans that protesters call in the
protest movement almost every day.
9 The author observation in Morocco proved the conclusion that women has signifi-
cant roles in the Arab Springs. They are not only participant but also the leader, speaker,
and other significant roles. See also Rola El-Husseini “Is Gender the Barrier to Democracy?
Women, Islamism, and the “Arab Springs”,  Contemporary Islam Journal (April, 2015). I also
witnissed the very significant role of student womens in the protest movement more than a
month.
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women protesters were more active than men protesters, with some even
served as “field coordinators”.
Unlike the elements of protesters in the massive “Morocco spring pro-
tests” (after the Tunisian and Egyptian popular revolution and before 2011
constitutional referendum), there were barely lay people taking part in the
protest, It was also clear that no political parties nor social religious groups
participated in the protest, as long as the author saw and asked some of
them. In the 20 February demonstration, as Al-Athari mentioned, protest-
ers flied various flags of political parties, social religious groups such flags of
h}arakah al-Tauh}i>d wa al-Is}la>h} and Jama>’ah al-Adl wa Ih}sa>n, etnic groups such
Amazigh”, youth organizations, etc.The protesters also came from differ-
ent professions, genders, social groups, and status.10 Theseare something
the author did not see in the new protest movement. These did not hap-
pen in the protest movements after the 2011 constitutional referendum,
in which most protesters were graduate students.
The post-2011 protests were characterized as being very well-organized.
The protesters – as the author saw- divided themselves into many groups;
each consisted of twenty to fifty persons with a coordinator. Each group
also had a specific banner, identity flags, and a simple amplifier system.
They also had logistic “officers” who distributed food and drink for the
protesters. In the beginning, they used to come to the assembly point
next to the train station individually and do not show their attributes
such as banners or pamphlets.  They would come like ordinary people,
but then began gathering in the “station field”. Shortly afterwards, many
people amounting to more than a thousand participants joined, and then
organized a long march heading to Muhammad V Street and concen-
10 Abdurrahim al-Athari, al-H }arakat al-Ihtija >jiyyah bi al-Maghrib Min Zama >n Intifa >d}ah al-
kubra Ila H }arakat 20 Shubbat }/Februyir, Rabat: 1997, 90-93,  inTaufiq al-Madini, al-Rabi’ al-
Arabiy…Ila > Aina? Ufuq Jadi>d li al-Taghyi>r al-Dimuqratiy, Beirut: Markaz Dira>sat al-Wah }dah al-
‘Arabiyyah, 2012, 300-1.
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trated in front of the parliament building. The two aspects, participants
and organization, differentiate the protest from the “Arab springs” pro-
test that involved people of diverse social classes in a more spontaneous
move and poorer organization.
However, did the protest have no Arab Spring in nature, meaning no
intention to demand for the fall of regime? The banners, brochures, pam-
phlets, and slogans, as well as the author’s observation and reading, do not
have any demand to royal regime, not even a word. Their long orations did
not call for any word about regimes. However, it doesn’t automatically mean
that the protests had no intention to touch the regime, especially the King.
Based on my observations and “secret interviews” with some protesters, I
came to a conclusion that the protests had an “Arab Spring dimension”,
that is, a popular movement to topple down the  regime. In various long
and relax conversations, the author got a clear hint to the question about
the real agenda of the movement, which said by some of them in my
interview is “al-niz }a>m al-malaki yarasu kulla al-fasa >d” (Royal regime leads
every “corruption”).11 Of course, the answer is not mainstream, but the
situation had forced them (some of them) to hide their real agendas.
In short, the nature of the Morocco protests after the 2011 constitu-
tional reform is a mixture of the Arab Spring and the old (pre-Arab Spring)
Moroccan protests. It means that the target is a regime change, but they
hide this real agenda, instead call publicly for other “usual” issues.
Half-hearted constitutional reform
This section will deal with the explanation on the protesters’ insistence
on launching the protests although they did not publicly demand the fall
of regime as they did before. The protesters’ reasons to go back to streets
11 The most of the students that the author interview were not admitting that their real
agenda is the fall of regime. However, two student from Rabat and Fas said to the author in
a sacret way that their real agenda is regime.
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were “the reluctance of the constitutional reform”. In the new constitu-
tion, the King has removed some of his own authorities such as to ap-
point prime minister and cabinet members, governors, ambassadors, etc.
Seen from the letter of the law, the King has lost many of his authorities
except in three areas including defense, religion, and foreign affairs, in
which he has absolute control.12 Practically, however, the King still con-
trols considerable executive powers, among others, to nominate rais al-
h}ukumah (prime minister as head of government) although he must nomi-
nate figure from the winning party in parliamentary election, and to
nominate members of cabinets based on the recommendation of the
head of government. The King also has the authority to nominate and
to head the council of ministers (al-majlis al-ilmi > al-A’la >).13In addition, it is
not easy to implement the new “rule” that curbs the power of the King.
That is, because the implementation disturbs the interests of the King’s
“inner circle”. Some parliamentary members and other important per-
son whom the author interviewed said that it would take more time for
such implementation to take place.14 In short, the 2011 constitution re-
form merely makes partial changes to the power structure of the King-
dom while keeping the King at the center of power.
The protesters thought that the 2011 constitutional reform did not
mean anything as there had been no real and substantial political changes
from autocracy to democracy.15 What happened was just a “pseudo” de-
12 Edisoft, Dustu>r al-Mamlakah…, 29-36.
13 Edisoft, Dustu>r al-Mamlakah…, 29.
14 The author did not mention these persons. However, among them are the very impor-
tant person in the Justice and development party, lecturer in Muhammad V University, and
Morocco Parliementary member.
15 This was also predicted by Yusep Waghid and Nuraan Davids in his article “Impossi-
bility of Democratic Citizenship Education in Arab and Muslim World” although their
research was merely based on the six Gulf Countries,  Studies in Philoshopy and Education
Journal, Vol. 33 (2014), 343-344.
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mocracy.  The source of power is not people. People participate to deter-
mine the government and their legislative representatives, but in fact
the “democratic institutions” is under the King’s domination, which is
strengthened by clash and conflict among people or between people and
governments, not between people and the King nor between govern-
ment and the King forever. The King’s honor is protected by the new
constitution as “amirulmukminin” (the spiritual leader of the believers)
and the real political commander as stated in article 46 of the new consti-
tution.16 The students whom I interviewed stated this clearly and repeadly.
Therefore, the protesters insisted to protest the government or par-
liamentary representative and avoided to protest the King. Police and
security forces tolerated the movement because any protest directed to-
ward government is considered legal and is protected by the constitution
and law. However, any form of protest or even a comment about the
King is considered illegal as it is a violation of the constitution and law,
for which police and security forces could take measures. Criticisms to
governments and legislative, no matter how bitter and unethical they
are, are considered usual business, while any attempt to question  the
King, no matter how soft the words used is, is considered a very serious
violation and must be eliminated by firm response.17In more than one
month of observation, the author never heard of the protesters men-
tioning the king or his name or his family, except in the “secret” inter-
view with some of the protesters.
More importantly, the 2011 constitutional reform did not solve the
real problem ofunemployment, widening gap in wealth distribution be-
16 Edisoft, Dustu>r al-Mamlakah…, 31.
17 Moreover, the King is highest commander of the Royal Armed Forces and, therefore,
has highest authority to appoint military officials as stated in the new constitution article
53. In addition, the royal army is the most powerful force in the Kingdom. Edisoft, Dustu>r
al-Mamlakah…, 54.
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tween the “royal circle” and the people, corruption, and the monopoly of
the strategic economic modes.They believed the awkward enlargement
and pseudo strengthening of “democracy” did not help tolift the root of
problem in Morocco. It is like a painkiller to relieve a pain, but it never
reaches the real cause of illness.
Lay people believed in the sacred status of the King as he claimed as
being a direct descendent of Prophet Muhammad,18 but the protesters
that constitute the younger generation and graduate students, challenged
their fellow citizens’ old mindset. The education system and government
financial support to the education in the Kingdom have helped to el-
evate the students’ critical opinion and attitudes. Education in the king-
dom is free from elementary school to doctoral degree, and critical/in-
fluential lectures and studies in sociology, politics, cultural studies, and
philosophy flourish in the country. The Moroccaneducation system is, in
fact, more open than that in the Arab and Muslim countries.Many stu-
dents have two or three diplomas, masters, or doctoral degrees, and such
cases of dual degrees is a norm in the Kingdom.Therefore, “democratic”
values develop very well among young Moroccans, which constitute “the
most democratic society” in the Arab world before the Arab spring era.The
young Moroccans aware very well of the situation in theircountry and of
the development of the Arab Spring in other Arab countries.
King’s popularity
Despite the widespread dissatisfaction, protesters chose to hide their “real”
agenda, that is, acriticism to the King. The King is still the most famous
and popularperson in Moroccan societies either in the cities or in villages
18 The author’s journey in many villages point out that the King is still very popular. The
author was not only ask some people but also among children. They still respected highly to
the King.
211
Morocco protest movements in the post-constitutional reform (Ibnu Burdah)
and mountain areas, in the urban or in the rural society, in the balad
mahzin or in the balad shiba. Balad Mahzin is urban and rural villages
recognizing the legitimacy of the Kingdom from the very beginning, while
balad shiba is periphery villages recognizing the Kingdom in the last mi-
nutes. Like what Ibn Khaldun, sociologist and historian pioneer, said,
the kabilah or Arab nomad society in deserts, tend to be last group that
give the recognition to the government in the last minutes, and they did
that by perforce.19 Hence, it is not easy for the protester to declare their
criticisms to the King while King is still inhis popularity.
Based on deep observation and interviews with people in Rabat (the
capital city) Casablanca (the largest city), as well as in Marrakesh, Fes,
Tangier, etc., it is sufficient to say thatthe King is so popular among people.
As I asked to one or two peoples in these cities, the King is the protector,
honor, and pride of the Moroccans. For them,Morocco is the King and
the people. The images of the King among the people is represented as a
religious man who loves his family and his people very much, supports
the development of sciences and knowledge, strengthensthe reforms and
democracy in the Kingdom, and cares highly with religious activities.
The most important thing is that people believed in the King being a
direct descendant of the Prophet through Hussein bin ‘Ali bin
Muhammad. Some artifacts,such as those in Hassan II mosque in
Casablanca and other places, depicting the lineage from the prophet to
the King are common. Such abelief makes them highly respect the
King.The ideais also expressed in many religious rituals such as Friday
praying (shala>h al-Jum’ah),  communalprayers, and especially in the maulid
(celebration and festival of Prophet birthday). The King as ami >r al-
mu`mini >n, the historic title in the Muslim memory, is declared explicitly
19 Abdurrahman bin Muhammad Ibnu Khaldun, Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun, edited by
Ahmad Zagbiy, Beirut: Shirkah Da >r al-Arqam bin Abi al-Arqam, n.a., 182-3.
212
IJIMS, Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 7, Number 2, December 2017: 201-219
either in the old or in the new Moroccan constitution. For people, it
means that the King is not merely a state leader but also a religious leader
that the obedience to him is part of their religiosity, and resistance to
him would mean a resistance to the religion.
However, the simplest —and therefore the most widespread—evidence of
the King’s popularity is the portrait of the King and his family. It is the most
vivid picture everywhere from the capital city to the most remote villages.
One would never find a place in Morocco without seeing the vivid picture of
the King. The pictures displayed in the important places is understood be-
cause of the “intervention of  Kingdom and government, but its display in
homes, very small shops in remoteand isolated places is certainly due toother
cause, that is, the King’s popularity. This explains very clearly why protesters
chose not to declare their real agenda toward regime.
On the other hand, there is no clear support from Moroccan political
forces and social-religious organizations. Political parties, either govern-
ing or opposition, instead confirmed their commitments on the monar-
chy system. Almost all party leaders, intellectuals, and even religious cle-
rics that the author interviewed asserted the uniqueness of the history of
Morocco. The first uniqueness is the historical facts that the recent Mo-
rocco regimehad existed and survived for about five centuries. It is the
longest monarchy ever existed in the Arab world today. Second, the
uniqueness of the Kingdom is the gradual historical changes. This is the
most articulated argument to reject “Arab Springs” movements. Accord-
ing to most of them, there is no historical precedence that the political
change in the Kingdom of Morocco is through people movement.  There-
fore, the 2011 constitutional referendum is a better way to Morocco in its
path to democracy. Based on these reasons, most political party leaders
donot give clear support to the people movements after the 2011 consti-
tutional reform.However, their attitudes today are relatively different from
those before the constitutional referendum.
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For social and religious groups, the popularity of the King and the
root of monarchy in Morocco are strong. H}arakah al-Tauh }i >d wa al-Is }la>h}
(Oneness of God and Justice Movement), one of Moroccan social reli-
gious groups,mentioned that the King and Kingdom is inseparable part
of Morocco. The group is very close to both the governing party (h}izb al-
‘Ada>lah wa al-Tanmiyah/Justice and Development party) and the royal fam-
ily. The group concerns very much in social activities, and tends to sup-
port the policies of the current governing party and the Kingdom. The
official statements of the group toward Tunisian and Egyptian people
revolution, as well as to the 20 February Moroccan movement, send clear
message that they support the regime and reject the street solution for
the Kingdom of Morocco. They stated clearly that they chose gradual
changes from the internal government, just as what had begun since the
throne of King Muhammad.20 Theinterviews with some members of this
group strengthened this conclusion.
Another influential group is Jama>‘ah al-‘Adl wa al-Ih }sa>n (Justice and
Charity group), which is a traditional religious groupbased on Islamic
mysticism movement (t}ari >qah). This group tends to opposite the King and
the Kingdom. Therefore, its leaders and their activities are spied by the
Kingdom apparatus although they never state publicly “their opposition”.
Its members sometimes involved in the student movements in front of
Parliament Building or along the Muhammad V Street. Based on their
statements on the Tunisian and Egyptian people revolutions as well as on
the 20 February Morocco movement, their attitude indicated that they
wanteda “real change” that touch the Royal regime. Their slogan, qabla
fawat al-Awan (before being late), clearly states that real changes such as
20 Bilal al-Talidi, Al-Isla >miyyu >n wa al-Rabi’ al-‘Arabi >: Al-Shu’u >d, al-Tahaddiya >t, Tadbi >r al-
H }ukm T }u >ni >s, Mis }r, al-Maghrib, al-Yama >n, Riyadh: Namaa for Research and Study Center,
2012, 47-8.
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those in Tunisia and Egypt is not limited to both countries.21It may happen
in Morocco as the later faces complex social, political, economic, and cul-
tural problems.It may be the hardestinternal statement toward Kingdom.
However, other commentsfrom political parties and social groups includ-
ing h}izb al-‘Ada>lah wa al-Tanmiyah, the most popular party,22 are firm that
they support the gradual and peaceful (not through street) reform.
In addition, the tribal support to the protests is not present, which is really
different from their total support in the ralliesfor Palestine and for condemn-
ing the Prophet cartoon that the author observed in Rabat. Buthalib’s re-
search also shows us that the Arab Spring is a momentum of qabilah awaken-
ing in social and political spheres in the Arab world.23In fact, tribal loyalty to
the Moroccan regime is very strong, and the support for the people move-
ment is nearlyabsent.In short, the King’s popularity and the “absence” of
support from political parties and social groups made the protest movements
hide their real agenda of touching the kingdom, especially the King.
Precautious stance on the Arab spring
The spreads of popular protestsin the Arab countries, and the success of
several movements to overthrow the old regimes, gave addition spirit to
the continuation of the Moroccan movement. The protests were not
influencedby the Tunisian or Egyptian protests because the Morocco pro-
test movementsstarted earlier than those in Tunisia or Egypt. However,
21 Bilal al-Talidi, Al-Isla >miyyu>n wa al-Rabi’…., 58-9.
22 It seems there is a special and close relationship between the party and the Kingdom
regime. The role of the party for absolute win of “2011 King constitutional reform” for
example is very high. The role of the party for political change is unique compared to the
other Islamist parties in other Arab countries. See Ibnu Burdah, “Ittijaha >t Jadi >dah li al-
Ah }za>b al-Isla>miyyah fi Dual al-Rabi’ al-`Arabiy”, Aljamiah: Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 52
No. 2 (2014), 459-480.
23 Muhammad Najib Buthalib, al-Z }awa >hir al-Qabaliyyah wa al-Jihawiyah fi al-Mujtama’ al-
‘Arabiy al-Mu‘a >s }ir: Dira >sah Muqa >ranah li al-Thauratain al-T}u>ni>siyah wa al-Libiyyah, Doha: Arab
Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, 16.
215
Morocco protest movements in the post-constitutional reform (Ibnu Burdah)
the escalation of the protest occurred just after the fall of the Tunisian
and Egyptian regimes. The Morocco protests in this era were in the forms
of rallies involving more than a million people in various cities in the
Kingdom. The movement was also supported by Amazigh movement,
and progressive journalist from Rabat to Casablanca.24 The term masi >rah
silmiyyah (peaceful rally) wasnot known in the Morocco street movements
before thenbut the terms they used were taz }a>hur (to demonstrate) or id}rab
(strike).25 In fact, the protest movements in these days were massive and
took place in almost all Morocco cities. The 2011 constitutional reform
softened very much, or even ended, the movements, but then, several
months after the 2011 constitutional referendum, the movements rose
again in different degree. It is the author’s conclusion that the protest
movements in other Arab countries constituted one of the many factors
for therise of the “new” Morocco protest movements.
Many political elites and some intellectuals that the author interviewed
rejected the conclusion. For them, the case of Morocco is unique com-
pared to that of the other Arab countries. The roots of the Morocco
protests, according to them, differ fromthose of the Arab Spring gener-
ally. In fact, the protestersand students declare the similar slogans used in
Arab Springs although with “some revisions”. The protest went without
“definitive” leaders and ideologies like Tunisian and Egyptian protests
did and used the similar social and information media, etc.26 Some stu-
24 Sami Zemni, “Moroccan Post-Islamism: Emerging Trend or Chimera” in Asef Bayat
(ed), Post Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013,
149.
25Abdurrahim al-Athary, al-H }arakat Ihtija >jiyyah…, 170.
26 Moreover, based on data of Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, the internet
user in the Kingdom of Morocco is very high, 33 percent of the population, or the second
in the 22 countries of the Arab world. A Group of Researchers, al-Infija >r al-‘Arabiy al-Kabi>r
fi al-Ab’ad al-Thaqa >fiyyah wa al-Siya >siyyah, Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Stud-
ies, 2012, 195.
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dents said that the real protest agenda involved critics to regime. For
some of them, the Monarchwas not merely obstacle for democracy but
also a source of recent Morocco problems.In short, there are many simi-
larities between the new Morocco protest movement and the Arab Spring.
It means that the spirit of the protest movements could be strengthened
by the protests movement in the other Arab countries.
However, the recent developments in the protest movement in
Yemen,Syria, Libya, and Bahrainresulting in the large number of casual-
ties and the physical and social destructions has caused some degrees of
hesitation to the movement. Furthermore, the continuous instability in
the Arab Spring countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisiahas disturbed
the firm protesters. In addition, the geographical distances between
Morocco and these countries are very close.  In Egypt, political parties
areunable to create a consensus in drafting constitution, government,
parliamentary, and many other issues in the earlier, and finally we wit-
ness the failure of democracy. Meanwhile, social and religious groups are
involved in hard conflict with one another and the government and
security forces failed to control the situations.27 In Libya, the capacity of
the state is very limited to govern and manage the country. This is mainly
because Libya seemingly constituted a “new state” that must be built from
scratch due to the absence of constitution, political parties, and parlia-
ments in the Moammar Qaddafi era.28 In addition, guerilla groups ex-
isted, involved in conflict each another, and it was not easy to integrate
27 Abu Dauh predicted just after Egypt Revolution that the challenges for a better
Egyptian future are very big and serious. See Khalid Kadzim Abu Dauh, “Tsaurah 25
qanu >nTha >ni >/Yanayir fi Barri Mishr: Muh }a>walah li al-Fahm al-Susiyulujiy”, in Taufiq al-
Madinietc, al-Rabi’ al-Arabiy: Ila > Aina? Ufuq Jadi>d li al-Taghyi>r al-Diymuqratjiy,  Beirut: Markaz
Dira >sat al-Wah }dah al-`Arabiyyah, 2012, 222.
28 Hasib said that the overthrow of Qaddafi regime is easier very much than to realize the
dream of Libyan people revolution, Khairuddin Hasib, “Libya ila> aina…suqu >t } al-Niz }a>m al-
Qadhafi >… wa lakin…?”, in Taufiq al-Madini, al-Rabi’ al-Arabiy…Ila > Aina?..., 276.
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them into the Libyan Army or security forces. Meanwhile, Tunisia sud-
denly became aninstable country after the assassination of Syukri Belaid,
one of the outstanding opposition leaders even after that they were able
to consolidate. In short, new developments in the Arab Spring countries
indicated that the people protest movements cause to the negative situa-
tions.
These developments in the neighboring countries are important in
the development of the Morocco protestmovement. Almost all people,
intellectuals, religious men, students, and lay people that the author in-
terviewed, were aware of the implication of such protest movements in
the Arab countries. The Morocco protesters were fully aware of these
development.They strived to organize the movement as best as they could
to make sure that the movements were well-arranged.All of them as-
serted that the Morocco reform had to be carried out peacefully although
there are many precedents that there had been violence in police res-
ponse to the previousprotest movements.
Conclusion
The nature of Morocco protest movement in the post-2011 constitutional
referendum contained the Arab Spring elements although it is imper-
ceptible. The Moroccan movements come earlier than the beginning of
the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt that stimulated the massive people
protest movements in Arab countries. However, the Egyptian and Tuni-
sian movements also escalated the Moroccan protest movement. The
protests became massive and very strong, and involved various social ele-
ments. Yet, the success of the King’s 2011 constitutional reform to ap-
pease “the fire” of the popular revolution as in the neighboring states
was something unique in the recent history of Arab Spring and in the
Muslim world. The protest receded for some time. However, students
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continued their protest with more limited levels and used more hidden
agenda strategy. They were dissatisfied with the limited constitutional
reform in which the King keeps holding the center of power and au-
thorities. But, they were fully aware that the King still has power and his
influences remain in place until today, while the supports from political
parties and religious-social groups for the movement were very low. Hence,
students opted to go on with the movements by calling for such interme-
diate agendas as poverty, unemployment, corruption, etc., while avoid
calling for the fall of the regime openly and directly as in the pre-2011
constitutional referendum. Morocco “protests” had existed long before
the spread of Arab Spring, went on even after the Arab Springs (before
2011 constitutional referendum), and after it. However, how the regime
made political reform through peaceful ways is something important in
the Arab world today.Even when it is not ideal, it is suffice to say that the
Moroccan experience in the political reform is an important lesson for
political reform in the current turbulent Arab world today, and perhaps
also in Muslim world in general.
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